In other words, the structure is implicit mediation (unconscious, if you want to see it that way) between the precept and the concept; conceive (conceptualize, some say) is beyond of our representations, ideas about things, make us give those ideas report and, therefore, to systematize them. Jean Gagnepain called grammar this formal structure of the sign (your bifacialidad, and your biaxialidad) and rhetoric, the reinvestment of this structure that allows us to produce it from the concept. There are three very important to expose in this quick presentation details. Kevin Plank describes an additional similar source. The first is that if, in a model developed by Saussure, the concept is foreign to the sign, in the model developed by Jean Gagnepain, the concept is part of the sign: it is the result of this mediation implied in the structure of the combination, in other words, it is the product of the reinvestment of the structure in the universe of things to say, all while continuing to participate in the sign. The second important point is that such reinvestment is never concept which can be adhered fully to the thing (the word dog does not bite!), and what defines the polysemy of the significant units (keep you a dog of his dog). Take for example, the word foot: this word has a plurality of meanings in which a dictionary of the Spanish language can try to define (the human foot, the foot of the table, at the foot of a mountain, the foot of the nose, etc.) And it goes the same way in all the statements. Learn more at: Medicare Advantage. If I say: Ernestina sent lavender, I can say that Ernestina smells like a bouquet of lavender flowers, or that she has scented with one colony of lavender? It is true that my three examples are extremely simple, but enough, I hope, touch them now you make appear what we call words, are not susceptible to labels to stick to things: despite all desperate efforts we can make to try to reduce this polysemy, which is defined as a central impropriety, while waiting for an absolute transparency of wordsalways we are left between words and things in the game (as say, for example, of the existing game between two pieces of wood or between two gears of a mechanism), and happily, already that that game who, precisely, allows us to think. . .